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11.1 Introduction
The papers in this volume tend to fall into two camps: those that take a
microeconomic perspective on growth and productivity and those that
take a more aggregate perspective. This paper contributes to the ongoing
eﬀort in macroeconomics to link the two perspectives.
One of the factors that makes this link diﬃcult is that adjustment at the
level of the individual or ﬁrm is often discrete, whereas adjustment at the
macroeconomic level is more smooth and continuous. This is especially
true of the decisions that contribute to growth and productivity. Individual
decisions, such as the decision to build a new factory, the decision to adopt
a new technology, or the decision to enter a new market, are all decisions
that carry large ﬁxed costs at the microeconomic level. Individuals and
ﬁrms therefore tend to take these actions infrequently. Other decisions,
such as the decision to buy a new car or to change a price, also share this
characteristic. Few people, for example, change the car that they drive
every day in response to the current value of their stock portfolio or their
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In spite of the discreteness of many microeconomic decisions, the stan-
dard approach to modeling in macroeconomics is to ignore all of this dis-
crete behavior and assume that all ﬁrms are represented by a single repre-
sentative ﬁrm that makes all of the investment decisions or that all
consumers are represented by a single representative consumer that makes
all of the consumption decisions. The decisions, which look so infrequent
and discontinuous when viewed from the perspective of the individual ﬁrm
or consumer, become quite smooth and continuous when viewed from the
perspective of these representative agents. These representative agents typ-
ically care only about the total stock of capital or durable goods or the av-
erage level of technology or prices. They make minor adjustments to these
variables in every period in order to equate the relevant marginal costs
and marginal beneﬁts of adjustment. While this abstraction provides a
tractable microeconomic foundation for the modeling of aggregate invest-
ment or durable demand, it is clearly the wrong microeconomic founda-
tion. The question is whether this makes any diﬀerence.
Whereas this paper is more theoretical and abstract than most of the
other papers in this volume, the issue of how to go from realistic micro-
economic analysis to realistic macroeconomic analysis is an important one
for all researchers interested in growth and productivity. There is a trade-
oﬀbetween realism and complexity in macroeconomic modeling. We want
models with dependable microfoundations, models that reﬂect the inﬂu-
ence of factors such as discrete and infrequent adjustment. We also want
simple and useful models of the economy as a whole, models like the rep-
resentative agent model. The message of this paper is that this trade-oﬀ is
not as costly as one might think. In spite of the importance of discrete ad-
justment at the microeconomic level, representative agent models can cap-
ture aggregate dynamics fairly accurately. The catch is that the representa-
tive agent must be parameterized to represent the market and not any given
individual. This means that standard macroeconomic analysis need only
be altered slightly in order to incorporate microeconomic discreteness at
the microeconomic level.
In recent years there has developed a large body of research that appears
to indicate the opposite. This literature suggests that microeconomic fric-
tions might have large macroeconomic consequences.1 The potential for
discrete adjustment to matter lies in the potential for the distribution of
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1. Discrete adjustment, particularly in the form of sS policies, has been studied in the con-
text of pricing (Caplin and Spulber 1987; Caplin and Leahy 1991, 1997; Dotsey, King, and
Wolman 1999), labor hiring and ﬁring (Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger 1997), investment
(Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power 1995; Thomas 2001), and the demand for durable goods
(Bertola and Caballero 1990; Bar-Ilan and Blinder 1996; Adda and Cooper 2000a,b; Caplin
and Leahy 2002a).durable goods, capital, prices, or technology to vary over time. For con-
creteness consider the capital stock. The capital stock of a representative
agent is simply the capital stock. In a discrete adjustment model, a given
aggregate stock of capital may be consistent with many distributions of
capital across ﬁrms. A typical ﬁrm will allow its capital holdings to drift
away from its optimal level, adjusting only when it hits some adjustment
trigger. The distribution of capital relative to these adjustment triggers will
aﬀect current productivity and inﬂuence future investment. The greater the
misallocation of capital, the more ineﬃcient the economy and the greater
the need for subsequent adjustment. If there are relatively many agents
near an upward adjustment trigger then investment will tend to be high in
the future. If there are relatively many near a downward adjustment trig-
ger then disinvestment is possible. In this way the distributional dynamics
can add an additional source of aggregate ﬂuctuation as misalignment
rises and falls over time. This added noise complicates both forecasts and
the interpretation of aggregate statistics.
In spite of this ﬂurry of recent research, the importance of discrete ad-
justment in macroeconomics is still an unsettled question. Bar-Ilan and
Blinder (1996) simply claim that “one implication of [discrete adjustment]
at the microeconomic level is that aggregate data cannot be generated by
ar epresentative agent.” They base this claim on the fact that their model
has margins of adjustment not present in the representative agent model,
namely the number of agents adjusting and the size of individual adjust-
ment. They do not, however, compare the dynamics of their model to the
dynamics of a representative agent model. Caballero and coauthors (Ca-
ballero 1993; Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger 1997) report statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects of discrete adjustment, but they do not show that these
eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant, nor do their models endogenize prices.
On the other hand, Caplin and Spulber (1987) present a model in which
discrete behavior aggregates to a representative agent, and Thomas (2001)
argues that equilibrium feedback may smooth out the eﬀects of discrete
adjustment. Moreover, Adda and Cooper (2000b) argue empirically that
most aggregate ﬂuctuations in durable goods markets are associated with
ﬂuctuations in price rather than the distribution of holdings.
Investigations of the role of discrete adjustment have been hampered by
the diﬃculty of constructing equilibrium models that can be easily com-
pared to their smooth representative agent counterpart. Given the impor-
tance of the distributional dynamics, the dimension of the state space
quickly becomes unmanageable. The literature tends to deal with this
problem in one of two ways. Much of the literature simply assumes that
prices are exogenous to agents’ actions. This severs the links among agents,
so that the decision problem of each agent can be studied in isolation. Ag-
gregation simply involves integrating across agents’ actions. Other papers
reduce the dimensionality of the problem by making assumptions on the
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tention to distributions that are uniform in relative prices, and Dotsey,
King, and Wolman (1999) assume that the support contains a bounded
number of points.
In this paper, we use a more realistic approximation to compare the ag-
gregate dynamics of a discrete adjustment model to that of a representative
agent model with continuous adjustment.2 The approximation was devel-
oped by Caplin and Leahy (2002a) in the context of durable goods. The
idea behind the approximation is that if there is enough time between an
agent’s purchases then individual heterogeneity will smooth the echoes of
previous cycles. Consider a market in which agents with holdings of a
durable below some trigger “little s” rebuild their stocks to some level “big
S.” High demand today then creates a lump in the cross-sectional distribu-
tion of holdings at big S. If there is no individual heterogeneity, then this
lump passes through the (S,s) bands as holdings depreciate and produces
an echo in demand when it reaches little s. This echo creates a link between
the market today and the market in the far future. Breaking this link greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis. In this paper we break this link by assuming that the
durable goods holdings of diﬀerent agents depreciate at diﬀerent rates.
This heterogeneity tends to disperse the lump and reduce the echo.
It is important to note that, in assuming pervasive microeconomic het-
erogeneity, we are taking to heart one of the principal conclusions of the
accumulating microeconomic literature on discrete adjustment. It is a
common ﬁnding in this literature that the variance of the idiosyncratic
shocks faced by an individual or ﬁrm is many times greater than that of ag-
gregate shocks.3 This heterogeneity tends to weaken the correlation of ad-
justment across ﬁrms. From a theoretical perspective, it is not important
that we put this heterogeneity in the depreciation rate. Any form of het-
erogeneity will do the trick. We could just as well have assumed that tastes,
income, wealth, or demographic variables were heterogeneous. The advan-
tage of our approximation is that it produces a comparatively simple equi-
librium model that can be solved analytically and compared to the repre-
sentative agent model.
It may seem that by smoothing the echoes we are eliminating the distri-
butional dynamics that make the discrete adjustment model distinctive.
This is only partially true. Whereas we rule out ﬂuctuations in the density
of holdings at the purchase trigger, we still allow the distribution to shift
with movements in “big S” and “little s.” We would argue that most of the
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2. This paper draws heavily on work presented in Caplin and Leahy (2002a,b). The ap-
proximation is worked out in Caplin and Leahy (2002a). The mapping between the represen-
tative agent model and the discrete choice model is worked out under more general assump-
tions in Caplin and Leahy (2002b).
3. See, in particular, Bertola and Caballero (1990) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000).
Many of the papers cited previously are also relevant to this issue.distributional dynamics that people associate with the business cycle are in
fact shifts in these thresholds. When the stock market crashes and people
feel less wealthy, they tend to hold on to their cars a bit longer and then pur-
chase less expensive cars. These decisions are well captured by shifts in the
adjustment trigger and target. They are not directly related to the density
of holdings.4Our model is consistent with the observation that ﬂuctuations
in aggregate investment activity are driven to a large extent by variation in
the number of ﬁrms making large investments.5
We present the representative agent model and the Caplin-Leahy ap-
proximation to the discrete choice model in the next section and compare
them in section 11.3. It turns out that the representative agent model and
the Caplin-Leahy approximation are observationally equivalent. Each im-
plies that the ﬁrst diﬀerence in sales follows an ARIMA(1,1). In principle,
this means that one could construct a mapping between the two models:
Choose realistic microeconomic parameters that characterize the discrete
adjustment model and then ﬁnd a representative agent model that yields
similar dynamics. We construct such a mapping and analyze some of its
properties. First, we consider the special case in which the supply curve is
perfectly elastic and ﬁnd that in this case the mapping between the param-
eters of the two models is the identity mapping; the models are equivalent.6
We then show that the mapping is nontrivial when there is a price response
to high demand. In particular, the depreciation rate and the real interest
rate for the representative agent model need to be adjusted in order to
match the dynamics of the discrete adjustment model.
To get a sense of the importance of the diﬀerences that arise, we use data
from the U.S. automobile industry to calibrate the Caplin-Leahy model.
The model ﬁts the data well, with a depreciation rate of 31 percent per an-
num, which compares favorably to the estimate of 33 percent reported by
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981). We then use the mapping to ﬁnd the corre-
sponding representative agent model. The representative agent model that
mimics the dynamics of the Caplin-Leahy model has a depreciation rate of
27 percent and a real interest rate of 12 percent. Although these diﬀerences
may appear large, it turns out that the market dynamics are relatively in-
sensitive to these two parameters. Therefore when the two models are cali-
brated with the same parameters their dynamics do not diﬀer greatly.
We conclude that in the case of the U.S. automobile industry not much
is lost by ignoring discrete adjustment at the microeconomic level and in-
stead modeling demand according to the continuous adjustment of a rep-
resentative agent. In more general settings, care needs to be taken in para-
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4. Adda and Cooper (2000b) argue that this extensive margin is more important to distrib-
utional dynamics than the intensive margin.
5. See Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power (1995).
6. It is ironic that in this case our model is a more ﬂeshed-out version of the model employed
by Bar-Ilan and Blinder, from which the foregoing quotation was taken.meterizing the representative agent model. Parameters that appear rea-
sonable on a microeconomic level may not be appropriate for a represen-
tative agent who proxies for a group of consumers facing adjustment costs.
This distinction may be especially important when conducting policy ex-
periments, since in this case the representative agent model that mimics the
discrete choice model might change with the change in policy regime.
We conclude the paper with some observations on when our approxi-
mation should hold and when it may not.
11.2 Two Models
In this section we present log-linearized versions of the representative
agent model and Caplin and Leahy’s approximation of the (S,s) model.
11.2.1 Representative Agent
We consider the problem of a representative agent who derives utility
from a stock of a durable good Kt. Utility is separable between durable and
nondurable consumption.7 Utility from durables takes a constant elastic-
ity form, U(K)   K / . The durable depreciates at a rate  . The price of
the durable is pt and the marginal utility of wealth is  t.
The consumer maximizes the present value of utility less the cost of new
purchases:
max
{Kt} ∑  t{U(Kt)   pt t[Kt   (1    )Kt 1]},
where   is the discount factor. The ﬁrst-order condition for this problem is
to set the marginal utility from the durable equal to a form of Jorgenson’s
user cost:
U (Kt)   pt t   (1    ) Etpt 1 t 1.
We close our description of the market with assumptions on price and
the marginal utility of wealth. Let Qt   Kt – (1 –  )/Kt–1 denote purchases
of the durable in period t. We assume that price is equal to marginal cost
and that marginal cost is a function of purchases and a cost shock
pt   Qt
 ct.
We assume that both shocks, ct and  t, follow random walks.8
11.2.2 The Caplin-Leahy Model
Because many of the parameters, such as   and  , have the same mean-
ing in the two models we will reuse them. If it becomes important to dis-
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7. This is a fairly standard assumption in the literature on durable goods. It receives some
empirical support from Bernanke (1985).
8. For the marginal utility of wealth to follow a random walk it must be the case that the
discount factor is equal to the interest rate.tinguish between the parameters of one model or the other we will use sub-
scripts or superscripts. For example,  rep will refer to   in the representa-
tive agent model, and qcl will refer to q in the Caplin-Leahy model.
Consider a continuum of consumers indexed by i∈[0, 1] who derive util-
ity from their holdings of a durable. As with the representative agent
model, we assume that each agent receives utility U(Kit)   Ki
 / , that the
price of a unit of the durable is pt, and that the marginal utility of wealth is
 t.9 We make two changes to the individual’s problem. First, when individ-
uals alter their holdings of the durable good they must pay a ﬁxed cost
equal to a fraction c of their current holding of the durable. This cost gen-
erates intermittent adjustment. Agents will wait until the gain from ad-
justment justiﬁes incurring the ﬁxed cost. Second, in order to spread pur-
chases of the durable over time we introduce heterogeneity in the form of
random depreciation. We assume that in each period each agent’s durable
depreciates by an amount  it which is independently and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) with a mean equal to  .
Let V(Kt,  t) denote the value of an optimal policy for a consumer hold-
ing a durable of size Kt given that the state of the market, to be discussed in
detail later, is  t. This problem may be written as










 Tj tp( Tj) ( Tj) [STj   (1   c)(1    it)KTj 1],
where
Kis   
Here Et is the mathematical expectation conditional on date t informa-
tion. The ﬁrst summation represents the utility that the agent receives
from the durable.   is the consumer’s discount rate, and U(Ks) is the util-
ity from holding a durable of size Ks. The second summation represents
the cost of successive purchases of the durable. Tj is a random time repre-
senting the date of the jth purchase. On these dates the consumer sells a
fraction 1 – c of his or her current holdings of the durable and purchases
STj new units of the durable good. Both purchase and sale take place at a
price pTj.  Tj is the marginal utility of wealth and translates the purchase
price into utility terms. Between purchase dates the durable depreciates by
an amount  it.
If the depreciation rate is great enough and the cost of adjustment is high
Kit if s   t and T1   t;
STj if s   T j;
(1    it)Kis 1 otherwise.
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9. With perfect capital markets the marginal utility of wealth will be equal across agents.enough, then it will be rare for agents to reduce their holdings of the
durable.10 Adjustment will be one-sided. Given the state of the market  t,
there will be a purchase target S( t) and a purchase trigger s( t)   S( t)
such that all agents with holdings less than s( t) adjust their holdings to
S( t).
We  close the model in the same manner as the representative agent
model. We assume that price is equal to marginal cost and that marginal
cost depends on total sales and a cost shock:
pt   Qt
 ct.
In this case total sales are equal to the product of the number of purchases
and the size of each purchase.
Solving for equilibrium in such a setting is made diﬃcult by the fact that
included in the state vector  t is the entire distribution of durable goods
holdings across agents. The number of agents with small holdings matters
because this will inﬂuence demand and hence price. The rest of the distri-
bution helps to predict the evolution of this lower tail. The Caplin-Leahy
model makes two assumptions that simplify these dynamics. Both as-
sumptions are motivated by the idea that when the time between purchases
is suﬃciently long the present will exert very little impact on the future. The
ﬁrst assumption is that the value of a new durable is exogenous to the cur-
rent state of the market and can therefore be expressed as V(K). The idea
is that current market inﬂuences will die out before the next purchase is
made. The second assumption is that the density of holdings in the neigh-
borhood of the purchase trigger is log uniform. This assumption requires
that there be suﬃcient time between purchases that the heterogeneity in de-
preciation smooths out the lumps in the distribution that may occur if a
large number of agents purchase the durable at one time. The precise con-
ditions necessary to support these assumptions are discussed in Caplin and
Leahy (2002a). The assumption that heterogeneity smooths away the
echoes of past shocks removes some of the distributional dynamics associ-
ated with discrete adjustment models. It is important to note, however, that
an important source of distributional dynamics remains, namely move-
ment in the adjustment trigger st. When st lies below its steady-state level
there will be “pent-up demand,” and when stlies above its steady-state level
demand will be below average for some time. Simulations of the model cal-
ibrated to the U.S. automobile market indicate that the assumptions hold
remarkably well (Caplin and Leahy 2002a).
Given these assumptions, the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimal pol-
icy are
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10. Depreciation creates a natural tendency toward one-sided adjustment. If the adjust-
ment cost is too small, however, increases in price or in the marginal utility of wealth may cre-
ate suﬃcient incentive for agents to reduce durable holdings.V (St)   pt t





     Et{V(St 1) 
V(St)   [St   (1   c)st]pt t     [St 1   (1   c)(1    )st] pt 1 t 1}
The ﬁrst equation states that the optimal target is determined by equating
the value of the marginal purchase to the cost. Note that the adjustment
cost does not appear here since it is sunk once the agent decides to pur-
chase. Note also that the determination of the optimal purchase size St is
essentially a static decision, in much the same way that nondurable con-
sumption is a static decision. This is a consequence of the unpredictability
of the future. The second equation states that the optimal trigger is deter-
mined by indiﬀerence between buying today and buying tomorrow. Note
here that we have replaced  it 1 with its mean.
V will inherit certain homogeneity properties from the constant elastic-
ity utility function and the proportional depreciation rate. It will be useful
to normalize V by the level of holdings of the durable good that would oc-
cur in steady state in the absence of frictions. Let κt denote this level of
holdings. Caplin and Leahy (2002a) show that V will be homogeneous of
degree   in κt:






Note that from our analysis of the representative agent model we know
that
κt
  1     [1    (1    )] ct t.
Finally, the number of purchases is determined by depreciation and the
evolution of the purchase trigger. With the assumption that the distribu-
tion of holdings is log uniform, the number of purchases becomes
nt    (lnst   ln st 1    ),
where   is the density of holdings and   – ln(1 –  ) ~  . Sales are there-
fore
Qt    St(lnst   ln st 1    ).
The evolution of cost and the evolution of marginal utility are as before.
This completes the presentation of the model.
11.2.3 Linearization
Our interest is in the ﬁrst-order diﬀerences between the two models. We
therefore log-linearize the dynamics. Appendix A presents the details of
the derivation. Here we present the results.
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equations:
(2) (  1)[1   (1    ) ]k ˆ
t   (p ˆt    ˆ
t)    (1    )Et(p ˆt 1    ˆ
t 1)
(3)  q ˆt   k ˆ
t   (1    )k ˆ
t 1
(4) p ˆt    q ˆt   c ˆt
(5) c ˆt   c ˆt 1    ct
(6)   ˆ
t    ˆ
t 1     t
There are three endogenous variables, k ˆ
t, p ˆt, and q ˆt, and two state variables,
c ˆt and   ˆ
t. All variables are in log deviations from their steady-state values.
Equation (2) is the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal holding of the dur-
able good. Equation (3) deﬁnes sales as a function of the change in durable
holdings. Equation (4) deﬁnes marginal cost, and equations (5) and (6) de-
ﬁne the evolution of the exogenous variables.
Appendix A shows that these equations may be combined to yield a
second-order diﬀerence equation in k ˆ
t, which has a solution of the form
k ˆ
t   xrepk ˆ
t 1   yrepe ˆt,
where xrep ∈ [0, 1], yrep   0, and e ˆt   c ˆt    ˆ
t.
The Caplin-Leahy model is deﬁned by the following system of equations:
(7) (  1)S ˆ
t   p ˆt    ˆ
t
(8) {s   [1    (1    )](1   c)sp }s ˆt   p [S   (1   c)s](p ˆt    ˆ
t) 
 p [S (1  c)(1   )s]
   Et(p ˆt 1   ˆ
t 1)  ( vκ  p S)
  (κ ˆt Et κ ˆt 1)
(9) q ˆt   S ˆ
t    
1
 
 (s ˆt   s ˆt 1)
(10) (  1    )κ ˆt    ˆ
t   c ˆt
(11) p ˆt    q ˆt   c ˆt
(12) c ˆt   c ˆt 1    ct
(13)   ˆ
t    ˆ
t 1     t
There are four endogenous variables, S ˆ
t, s ˆt, p ˆt, and q ˆt, and two state vari-
ables, c ˆt and   ˆ
t (κ ˆt is a function of these). As before, all variables are in log
deviations from their steady state values. Equation (7) is the ﬁrst-order
condition for purchase target. Equation (8) is the ﬁrst-order condition for
purchase trigger. Equation (9) deﬁnes sales as a function of the target and
the change in the purchase trigger. Equation (10) deﬁnes the frictionless
steady-state holdings. Equations (11), (12), and (13) are the same as their
representative agent counterparts.
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following second-order diﬀerence equation in s ˆt, which has the form
(14) s ˆt   xcls ˆt 1   ycle ˆt,
where xcl ∈ [0, 1] and ycl   0.
At this point we note several diﬀerences between the two models. First,
purchases in the Caplin-Leahy model depend separately on the number of
individual purchases and the size of each individual purchase. Second,
there is no role for the aggregate stock of durables as in the representative
agent model. Only the agents who make purchases aﬀect sales. Third,
whereas purchases in the representative agent model depend on the current
price and the price next period, the purchase target in the Caplin-Leahy
model depends on the current price and the price in the distant future as
reﬂected in the steady-state target. Finally, there is no role for the adjust-
ment cost in the representative agent model.




In this section, we compare the dynamic properties of the two models.
We begin by solving for the dynamics of sales in each case. The price dy-
namics follow from the supply curve.
The stock of durables in the representative agent model evolves accord-
ing to
k ˆ
t   xrepk ˆ
t 1   yrepe ˆt.
Hence, sales are equal to
q ˆ t









t 1 xrepq ˆ rep
t 1 yrep  
 
1
 (  ˆ




 (  ˆ
t 1 c ˆt 1) .
Sales in the Caplin-Leahy model evolve according to
q ˆt   S ˆ
t    
1
 
 (s ˆt   s ˆt 1).
Substituting for S ˆ
t and s ˆt yields
q ˆt






     
1
 
 (s ˆt   s ˆt 1)   





cl   xclq ˆ t






     
1
 
 ycl   
1   
1
  
  e ˆt






     
1
 






  e ˆt 1.
How Important Is Discrete Adjustment in Aggregate Fluctuations? 361In each case, the ﬁrst diﬀerence of sales follows an ARIMA(1,1). There
is therefore a sense in which the two models are observationally equivalent.
This equivalence is remarkable since it relates a model with discrete ad-
justment at the microeconomic level to a representative agent model with
no adjustment costs.
We can think about how to parameterize the representative agent model
to mimic the dynamics of the Caplin-Leahy model. For this we need to
match the coeﬃcients on q ˆt, e ˆt, and e ˆt–1. This requires










     
1
 
 ycl   














     
1
 








(15) xrep   xcl










In principle, a mapping between the parameters of the two models can
be constructed as follows. Given any parameterization of the Caplin-Leahy
model ( cl,  cl,  cl, and c), solve for xrep, yrep, and  rep using equation (15).
Given xrep, yrep, and  , derive  rep,  rep, and K using the deﬁnitions of xrep
and yrep and the steady-state relationship
Krep
  1   [1   (1    rep) rep]p .
How do the two models diﬀer? We attempt to answer this question in two
ways. First, we consider a simple situation in which the supply curve is per-
fectly elastic and the equations simplify greatly. Second, we match the pa-
rameters of the two models to data from the market for new cars in the
United States, and ask whether and how much they diﬀer in this case.
11.3.1 A Simple Case
We begin with a situation in which the mapping is simple. If   0, then it
can be shown that xcl   0 and ycl   1/( cl – 1). This implies that xrep   0, yrep
 1/( rep – 1), and  rep    cl/(1    cl). Hence,  rep    cland  rep is equal to  cl
to a ﬁrst order. Note that in this case  rep and Krep do not aﬀect the dynamics
of the representative agent model and c does not aﬀect the dynamics of the






 ycl   1
362 Andrew Caplin and John LeahyCaplin-Leahy model. In sum, identical parameterizations of the two models
yield identical dynamics. In this case, the two models are identical.
P 1. If   0, then the response of the Caplin-Leahy model to a
shock is identical to the response of a similarly parameterized representative
agent model.
This result is similar to the neutrality result of Caplin and Spulber (1987)
in that a heterogeneous agent model with ﬁxed costs delivers dynamics sim-
ilar to a representative agent model without frictions. The intuition is
straightforward. In the absence of a price response, a shock in the Caplin-
Leahy model causes a once-and-for-all shift in both S ˆ
tand s ˆtby an amount
1/(  – 1). The intuition is the same as for the permanent income hypothe-
sis: A shift in price or marginal utility causes a proportional shift in policy.
Total purchases, q ˆt, depend on S ˆ and the ﬁrst diﬀerence of s ˆt. S ˆ rises per-
manently, but  s ˆt rises only for one period. The result is that total pur-
chases follow an MA(1). Since  s ˆt receives a weight 1/  in q ˆt, the lagged
moving average (MA) coeﬃcient is approximately 1 –   as in Mankiw’s
(1982) representative agent model.
11.4 Evidence from the U.S. Auto Market
In the general case in which   0, this exact mapping between the two
models fails to hold. This can easily be seen from the fact that the adjust-
ment cost c enters the equations that determine xcl and ycl. This cost plays
no role in the representative agent model.
In order to see how important these diﬀerences may be in practice, we ﬁt
the model to data from the market for new cars in the United States. We take
data on the number of new cars sold from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). n ˆ is the log of this number. The BEA also has data on the average
purchase price of new cars. We normalize this number by the price index for
new cars obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and take logs to get
S ˆ. q ˆ is the sum of n ˆ and S ˆ. We construct the relative price of new cars, p ˆ, by
dividing the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for new cars by the gross domes-
tic product (GDP) deﬂator for nondurable goods and taking logs.
Although most of the data are available at a monthly frequency, we esti-
mate the model at a quarterly frequency. The monthly data contain a lot of
noise and are dominated at times by movements in inventories, which we
have not modeled. Aggregating lessens these problems and yields sensible
results. We leave the inclusion of inventory movements for future work.
We restrict the analysis to the period beginning with the ﬁrst quarter of
1967 and ending in the ﬁrst quarter of 1990. We begin in 1967 because there
are some violent movements in the average price of used cars in the early
1960s, which appear to be more problems with the data than real economic
phenomenon. We end in 1990 because there is a trend break in the series
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begin to replace the station wagon. Whereas station wagons were catego-
rized as cars, minivans and SUVs are categorized as light trucks.
We choose to work with seasonally adjusted data. In principle the model
should work as well with seasonally adjusted data. Including seasonality,
however, complicates the error structure without adding anything to the
analysis.
11.4.1 The Response of Prices
We begin with the response of prices, since if the supply curve is elastic
the models are identical. To estimate  , we regress p ˆ on q ˆ.We instrument
for the demand for autos using the current and lagged change in non-
durable consumption, the CPI for energy, and the federal funds rate, as well
as the lagged number of purchases. All instruments were expressed in logs.
The consumption Euler equation implies that nondurable consumption
should be proportional to the marginal utility of wealth, which acts as a de-
mand shock in our model. The lagged number of purchases should be cor-
related with st–1 and hence the current number of purchases. The federal
funds rate and the price of energy were included under the hypothesis that
they primarily shift durable demand.
Table 11.1 presents the second-stage results from the two-stage least
squares (TSLS) estimation.
The coeﬃcient on q ˆt is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The t-statistic is
about 4.75. We conclude that supply is not perfectly elastic and there is a
potential for the two models to diﬀer. Given the positive value for  , it is
diﬃcult to justify modeling the demand for durable goods under the as-
sumption of exogenous prices, as is the practice in much of the literature.11
This result is fairly stable. The coeﬃcient on q ˆ is little changed if only
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Table 11.1 Instrumental Variables Estimation of the Eﬀect of Durable Demand on
the Relative Price of Durables
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error Probability
q ˆt .171 .036 .000
Constant 4.548 .207 .000
Trend –.018 .003 .000
100   trend2 .012 .005 .001
10,000   trend3 –.002 .002 .293
11. Mankiw (1982), Bernanke (1985), Caballero (1993), and Chah, Ramey, and Starr (1995)
all make this assumption. All of these papers (implicitly or explicitly) assume that the price of
durable goods is independent of demand and ﬁnd that the estimated parameters do not make
sense within the context of the model. It is possible, however, that price is not perfectly elas-
tic and that the estimated parameters need to be reinterpreted in light of the mapping between
the representative agent model and the sS model.lagged instruments are used or if only the consumption of nondurables is
used as an instrument. It is also similar to other results in the literature. Bils
and Klenow (1998) ﬁnd that the prices of a large number of durable goods
are procyclical. Adda and Cooper (2000b) estimate a structural model of
the market for new cars. Using data for France and the United States, they
ﬁnd that they need a positive correlation between their demand shock and
their price shock in order to ﬁt the data.
We next estimate   and x, since these can be observed from the data.
11.4.2 The Number of Purchases
The number of purchases n ˆ is related to the change in the purchase trig-
ger s ˆ.If   0, then s ˆ follows an AR(1). It is easy to see that n ˆ also follows
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process (AR[1]) and that the autoregressive co-
eﬃcient is xcl.
n ˆt   xcln ˆt 1   ycl( ct     t)
According to the model, the error in this equation is independent of n ˆt–1.
We  can therefore estimate xcl from the data on n ˆ using ordinary least
squares (OLS).
Table 11.2 ﬁts an AR(1) to our data on n ˆ.
xcl is estimated fairly precisely. It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both zero
and one. This relationship is also very stable. Further lags are insigniﬁcant.
Dropping the trend variables has no eﬀect on the autoregressive coeﬃ-
cient; neither does including the change in nondurable or the price of en-
ergy in the regression.12
11.4.3 The Elasticity of Demand
We can calibrate the elasticity of demand   from the reaction of the av-
erage size of purchases to price
(16)  S ˆ




 ( p ˆt      ˆ
t).
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Table 11.2 Estimation of n ˆt   xcln ˆt–1   εt
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error Probability
n ˆt–1 .711 .075 .000
Constant 1.631 .749 .032
Trend .027 .036 .416
100   trend2 –.037 .046 .433
10,000   trend3 .016 .021 .439
12. It is also interesting that lagged disposable income is insigniﬁcant. This equation there-
fore passes a Hall orthogonality test of the rational expectations permanent income hypoth-
esis.We estimate equation (16) using data on nondurable consumption to con-
trol for changes in the marginal utility of wealth. We also include the
change in the federal funds rate and the change in the price of energy as
controls. The results are reported in table 11.3.
The coeﬃcient on  p ˆt is fairly stable. It does not change if we estimate
the equation in levels, omit the trend terms, or omit the other controls. The
coeﬃcient implies a value of   approximately equal to –1.5.
11.4.4 Fit
Whether the models diﬀer depends on how one interprets the data. We
do two experiments. First, we use the data to back out parameters of the
Caplin-Leahy model and then use the mapping described previously to de-
rive the corresponding parameters of the representative agent model.
Given our estimates of   –1.5, x   .71 and   .17, and we can calculate
 cl given values for c and  . We calibrate   .99, which is consistent with
a real interest rate of 4 percent per annum, and select a number of values
for c ∈ [0, 1]. It turns out that  cl is relatively insensitive to the choice of c.
For c   1, we obtain  cl   .094. For c   .2, we obtain  cl   .091. The for-
mer implies an annual depreciation rate of 32.6 percent, whereas the latter
implies 31.7 percent. Both of these are nearly identical to the calculations
of 33.33 percent per annum estimated for autos by Jorgenson and Sullivan
(1981). The parameterization of the representative agent model that mim-
ics the Caplin-Leahy model has a value for  r of .074 if c   .2 and .076 if
c 1, and a value for  of .971 if c .2 and .977 if c 1. These depreciation
rates are approximately 15 percent lower and are consistent with annual
rates of depreciation of 26.5 and 27.2. These discount factors are consis-
tent with real interest rates in the neighborhood of 12 percent per annum.
Seen in this light the models appear very diﬀerent.
The second look that we take is to use our derived parameters for the
Caplin-Leahy model and insert these into the representative agent model
to derive xrep. This exercise yields a value for xrep of .68 if c   .2 and .67 if
c   1. These values are within one standard deviation of the estimate of x.
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Table 11.3 Estimation of Equation (16)
Variable Coeﬃcient Standard Error Probability
 p ˆt –.403 .179 .027
Constant .003 .042 .936
Trend –.001 .002 .787
100   trend2 .001 .003 .609
10,000   trend3 –.001 .001 .490
 cons .551 .274 .047
 penergy –.086 .072 .232
 ﬀunds .000 .001 .824Seen this way, similar parameterizations of the two models yield similar re-
sults.
11.5 Conclusions
The search for microfoundations for macroeconomics has brought to
the fore the trade-oﬀ between realism and tractability in macroeconomic
modeling. We need models that reﬂect the choices that agents actually
make in order to make accurate measurements, to forecast and to predict
and evaluate the eﬀects of policy experiments. Models that are too realis-
tic, however, quickly become as incomprehensible as the world that they
are trying to explain.
In this paper we have developed an approximation of discrete choice that
is simple enough that we can solve for the equilibrium dynamic of a mar-
ket. We found that the discrete choice model and the representative agent
shared similar dynamics but that their parameterization potentially di-
ﬀered. Although in the case of the U.S. automobile market these diﬀer-
ences did not appear to be too great, care should be taken in parameteriz-
ing the representative agent model. Parameters that appear reasonable on
a microeconomic level may not be appropriate for a representative agent
who proxies for a group of consumers facing adjustment costs. This dis-
tinction may be especially important when conducting policy experiments,
since in this case the representative agent model that mimics the discrete
choice model might change with the change in policy regime.
At this point it might be useful to comment on a number of potential
eﬀects of discrete adjustment that are ruled out in our approximation.
Most obviously, our assumption that there was enough time between pur-
chases that heterogeneity in depreciation smoothed out lumps in the cross-
sectional distribution of holdings ruled out echoes of previous booms in
sales. In our view, this is probably not an important diﬀerence between the
discrete adjustment model and the representative agent model, since in-
dividual heterogeneity is pervasive. More important, in our view, is the
distinction between one-sided and two-sided adjustment. We implicitly
assumed that adjustment was one-sided—that is, that agents only adjust
from small cars to large cars. With one-sided dynamics, heterogeneity
tends to ﬂatten the distribution of holdings between the (S,s) bands. With
two-sided adjustment this is no longer the case. The distribution of hold-
ings tends to be tent-shaped: It peaks near the purchase target and slopes
downward toward the triggers. Changes in the purchase triggers therefore
lead to changes in the density near the trigger. This adds an additional
source of dynamics. How these dynamics relate to the representative agent
model remains an open question.
Whether dynamics are one-sided or two-sided depends on the context.
Situations with strong drift, such as inﬂation in prices or depreciation in in-
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We linearize the model about the nonstochastic steady state. We begin
with the ﬁrst-order condition for the durable stock:
(  1)K  1k ˆ
t   p (p ˆt    ˆ
t)    (1    )p Et(p ˆt 1    ˆ
t 1)
Hats represent log deviations from steady-state values. Variables without
time subscripts denote steady-state values. Since K –1   (1 – [1 –  ] )p , in
steady state, the ﬁrst-order condition becomes
(A1) (  1)[1   (1    ) ]k ˆ
t   (p ˆt    ˆ
t)    (1    )Et(p ˆt 1    ˆ
t 1).
Linearizing the deﬁnition of sales yields
Qq ˆt   Kk ˆ
t   (1    )Kk ˆ
t 1,
or, since Q    K in steady state,
(A2)  q ˆt   k ˆ
t   (1    )k ˆ
t 1
Log-linearizing marginal cost, we get
pp ˆt   Q c( q ˆt   c ˆt),
or, since p   Q c,
(A3) p ˆt    q ˆt   c ˆt.
Together with the evolution of the shocks, equations (A1)–(A3) deﬁne the
model.
Finally, substituting for price in the ﬁrst-order condition yields the fol-
lowing second-order diﬀerence equation:
p (c ˆt    ˆ
t)    (1    )p Et(c ˆt 1    ˆ
t 1)   
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t 1
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which has the following solution:
k ˆ
t   xrepk ˆ
t 1   yrepe ˆt,
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We ﬁrst linearize the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal purchase size:
 εs(S ˆ
t   κ ˆt)   (  1)κ ˆt   p ˆt    ˆ
t
Here εs   –[v″(S/K)(S/K)]/(v (S/K)]. If the time between purchases is
suﬃciently long εswill be approximately equal to 1 –  .13For simplicity, we
adopt this approximation, so that the ﬁrst-order condition becomes
(A4) (  1)S ˆ   p ˆt    ˆ
t.
Linearizing sales, we get
Qq ˆt    S S ˆ
t    S(s ˆt   s ˆt 1),
which, since Q    S , becomes
(A5) q ˆt   S ˆ
t    
1
 
 (s ˆt   s ˆt 1)
The marginal cost equation is the same as in the representative agent
model:
(A6) p ˆt    q ˆt   c ˆt
Finally, we linearize the ﬁrst-order condition for the purchase trigger:
v Sκ (S ˆ
t κ ˆt)   vκ κ ˆ t p SS ˆ
t (1  c)sp s ˆt [S (1  c)s]p (p ˆt   ˆ
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13. If the time between purchases were ﬁxed then εs would be exactly 1 –  . The diﬀerence
arises since an increase in S postpones the next purchase.Using the ﬁrst-order condition for S, the S ˆ
t terms cancel, leaving
(A7) ( vκ   p S)(κ ˆ t Et κ ˆ t 1)  p [S (1  c)s](p ˆt   ˆ
t) 
 p [S (1  c)(1   )s] Et(p ˆt 1   ˆ
t 1) 
 {s  [1   (1   )](1  c)sp }s ˆt
Finally, linearizing the frictionless capital stock yields
(A8) (  1    )κ ˆt    ˆ
t   c ˆt.
Equations (A4)–(A8) deﬁne the model.
To derive the second-order diﬀerence equation in s ˆt, we begin with equa-
tion (A7). We replace v(S/κ)κ  using the steady-state relationship
(1    ) v  
S
κ
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t)  p [S (1  c)(1   )s] Et(p ˆt 1   ˆ
t 1).
Next, combining the expressions (A4)–(A6) yields
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which allows us to replace p ˆt:
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manent,
Et(  ˆ
t 1   c ˆt 1)    ˆ
t   c ˆt,
to get
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This second-order diﬀerence equation has a solution of the form
s ˆt   xs ˆt 1   ye ˆt,
where
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372 Andrew Caplin and John LeahyComment Jong-Il Kim
Caplin and Leahy’s (1991) model made a great contribution to the micro-
foundation of macroeconomics. The model suggested a theoretical possi-
bility that the dynamics of price change may have diﬀerent characteristics
from those simply expected from microeconomic behavior. Under certain
conditions, the discrete adjustment of price or ﬁxed price that plays a crit-
ical role in generating aggregate ﬂuctuation and nonneutrality of money
cannot be taken for granted based on microeconomic behavior of eco-
nomic agents.
In this paper, they show that the framework could be applied to the ﬂuc-
tuation of consumption of durable goods such as automobiles. This so-
called Ss model introduces the state-dependent discrete adjustment be-
havior speciﬁcally in the model. The economic agents do not adjust their
behavior continuously. Instead they stick with the current level of con-
sumption until the changing situation hits a trigger point (small s). At the
trigger point, they jump to the new level (big S). The most important con-
tribution of this model is that it shows the possibility that the discrete ad-
justment by itself may not lead to aggregate ﬂuctuation. As long as there
is heterogeneity of agents in their timing of this discrete adjustment, the
model will behave like the model with continuous adjustment as the repre-
sentative agent model. When the agents are uniformly distributed in terms
of their timing of adjustments and the economic situation changes
smoothly, then there would be a constant proportion of agents changing
their behavior. Therefore, discrete adjustment does not generate aggregate
ﬂuctuation because it is smoothed out.
Furthermore, they show that the representative agent model could be
observationally equivalent with the Ss model under certain conditions.
That is, it is possible to parameterize the representative agent model to
mimic the dynamics of the Ss model. When the supply curve is perfectly
elastic, they showed that the SS model and the representative agent model
yield identical dynamics if parameterized identically. However, if the price
responds to the demand, then they show the relation is not that simple.
Thus they caution that with the discrete price adjustment, we cannot pa-
rameterize the representative agent model with seemingly reasonable pa-
rameters based on a simple guess on micro behavior. They provide the ev-
idence from data from the automobile industry in the United States that
the supply curve of automobiles is not elastic. They also add a caution that
it is especially important when conducting policy experiments.
The Ss model provided an interesting point that even with discrete ad-
justment its impact on aggregate economy can be faded away if the struc-
ture of the economy allows enough heterogeneity of timing of adjustment
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Jong-Il Kim is associate professor of economics at Dongguk University.among economic agents. As the basic idea and theoretical proposition are
interesting and useful, it seems that more work is needed to link the theory
to the empirical studies.
The motivation of the paper is to ﬁnd out how aggregate variables behave
dynamically. The paper also started from a general discussion about the
eﬀect of discrete adjustment on the dynamics of aggregate variables. The
empirical part uses data on the automobile industry to discuss the model.
However, there are many diﬀerent types of durable goods in the economy.
For instance, huge information technology (IT) investments in the 1990s
are now blamed for the current recession. It may be an example that past
lumpy investment has a lasting echo. It is possible that we will see a cycle of
IT investment some time in the future. One may ﬁnd diﬀerences in the dy-
namics of various types of durable goods. Then it would be interesting if the
sources of the diﬀerences are investigated and modeled theoretically.
The paper reports as empirical evidence that the model ﬁts the data that
the implied estimate of depreciation rate is about 32 percent per year, quite
similar to the depreciation rate reported by Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).
It should be checked whether Jorgenson and Sullivan’s estimate is the rate
of physical depreciation or the rate of depreciation in the market value.
Conceptually the right depreciation for the model in the paper is physical
depreciation. A depreciation rate of about 30 percent per year seems too
high for the physical depreciation.
The research done in this paper would contribute much to many issues
in macroeconomics such as labor hiring, investment, and consumption of
durable goods, as well as price adjustment if further studies on the issues
provide more interesting empirical ﬁndings to be attacked theoretically.
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Comment Assaf Razin
I must emphasize at the outset that I am a bit of an “outsider” to this strand
of the literature. Nevertheless, I read the paper, and I was impressed by the
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versity, Friedman Professor of International Economics at Cornell University, and a research
associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.technical skills of the authors in solving what looks like a diﬃcult dynamic
problem.
In macroeconomics we tend to simplify complex problems and ignore
some microeconomic behavior patterns that get washed out when the indi-
vidual behavior is aggregated into a stylized macro behavior of the group
of consumers. Discrete adjustments are hard to formulate dynamically.
The hope is that discrete adjustments of investment in durable goods on the
level of individual consumers could be smoothed out in the aggregate, so
as to lead to continuous aggregate adjustment. Most of the macro analysis
is therefore based on continuous adjustments.
The main scope of the paper is such a comparison between the repre-
sentative agent’s continuous adjustment of investment in consumption
durables and discrete adjustment of such investment by an individual con-
sumer.
The scope for applications of the analysis to other issues is broad: in-
vestment booms and busts, ex ante price setting by monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms, and labor hiring and ﬁring.
The aggregation problem of discrete adjustments is hard because the
equilibrium price of durables depends on aggregate demand, which in turn
depends on how many people adjust their purchases; and the latter de-
pends on what is the price that people expect will prevail when they execute
the transactions.
The main simplifying assumptions are (1) the marginal utility of wealth
is constant, and (2) only upward adjustment is permitted. That is, the indi-
vidual will let the car that he or she owns depreciate for a few years, and at
some optimal time or state he or she will purchase a new, upgraded car.
The main ﬁnding is that the representative agent, continuous adjustment
model and the aggregate of the discrete adjustment individual models are
observationally equivalent.
The assumption of no downward adjustment may, however, limit the ap-
plicability of the analysis. For example, labor hiring and ﬁring, consisting
of both upward and downward adjustments, are excluded as an applica-
tion. Concerning the application for the theory of inventories, I would like
the authors to expand. It would be interesting to see what are the patterns
over time of inventory accumulation. Speciﬁcally, can the simulations from
the discrete adjustment model have a diﬀerent dynamic path than the con-
tinuous model around the time that inventories accumulate—after the busi-
ness cycle peak when the economy is hit by unexpected negative shocks,
and after the trough when the economy expects larger future sales?
The implications of the analysis for dynamic models that are estimated
econometrically are not pursued here at all. Examples of useful applica-
tions of discrete adjustments in econometrics-based models are Caballero
and Engel (1999, 2000). I encourage the authors to highlight applications
of this kind, as they are related to the theory they developed.
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